The former is a theoretical question, the answer to which would be based upon a particular view of the patient's right to self-determination. The latter asks for moral guidelines or rules of thumb to be followed in practice. While a theoretical principle may clarify a particular moral value, a policy must often strike a compromise between competing values in a way which is morally acceptable. Therefore, the first question is conceived as the philosophically prior one, in the sense that policy ought to be based upon considerations which include a conception of the patient's rights. Most of the discussion about informed consent has focused on questions of policy, to the neglect ofmore fundamental questions. In order to decide what, as a matter of policy, we shall consider to be the limits of the physician's responsibility to inform, we would do well to consider the theoretical question.
Introduction
Although there has been considerable discussion emphasising the importance of obtaining informed consent prior to carrying out medical procedures, little attention has been given to the limits of the patient's right to information. We need to distmiguish two separate questions:
i) To what information does a particular patient have a right ? 2) What policy should a physician follow in divulging information to patients ?
The former is a theoretical question, the answer to which would be based upon a particular view of the patient's right to self-determination. The latter asks for moral guidelines or rules of thumb to be followed in practice. While a theoretical principle may clarify a particular moral value, a policy must often strike a compromise between competing values in a way which is morally acceptable. Therefore, the first question is conceived as the philosophically prior one, in the sense that policy ought to be based upon considerations which include a conception of the patient's rights. Most of the discussion about informed consent has focused on questions of policy, to the neglect ofmore fundamental questions. In order to decide what, as a matter of policy, we shall consider to be the limits of the physician's responsibility to inform, we would do well to consider the theoretical question. Informed consent: theory and policy 197
If there is any reason to believe that the particular patient or subject wants more information than the reasonable citizen, then the patient or subject's own standard of certainty must apply. If a subject communicates to researchers that he wants more information of a particular sort than the reasonable person would, there is an obligation of the researcher to give that additional information, if the subject is to continue to be part of the experiment.3 Veatch's policy is proposed specifically in regard to informing the patient or subject in the context of experimental procedures. The implication which his view has in this context is that a patient who is participating in an experiment has the right to whatever information he wants for the purpose of making his decisions. If a researcher is unwilling to answer every question, then, according to Veatch, he has an obligation to drop the subject from the research. With regard to non-innovative procedures, no explicit statement of policy is made by Veatch. However, he does state his agreement with 'those who favor even more caution in getting consent for clinical care and so-called therapeutic experiments than non-therapeutic research because of the strong, sometimes coercive, interest a sick person has in maintaining the approval of medical professionals.' 3 Thus, it would seem to be an implication of his view that even in the context of standard therapy the patient has the right to whatever information he wants for the purpose of deciding upon a course of treatment.
The difficulty with this view is that it does not recognise any limit to the patient's right to information: it gives him at least a prima facie right to whatever information he wants. At the theoretical level, I suggest that this goes too far. Surely, not all the information a patient might conceivably want is genuinely relevant to the decision he must make. Furthermore, it seems to follow from this view that if the patient were to want a course in medicine, then the physician would have a duty to give it to him. But it is not at all plausible to think that the physician's duty to inform goes this far.
I suggest that the right to self-determination does not entail the right to whatever information a person wants. But what requirements for information are entailed by the right to self-determination? I believe the correct answer is that the patient is entitled to information which is sufficient to provide him with the opportunity to make a rational decision.
Several remarks are required in order to explain what is meant by this. First of all, there is no suggestion here that patients should be required to make rational decisions. What is being claimed is that each patient has the right to all the information he needs in order to make a rational decision. Secondly, the information which is needed in order to make a rational decision will depend upon the particular patient's life plans and values. For example, whether a certain unlikely side-effect is relevant to a rational decision may depend upon the plans which the patient has for himself. Furthermore, the information which needs to be disclosed will depend upon the particular patient's level of knowledge. This fact provides the basis of our criticism of the standard of the reasonable person in the patient's position. Thirdly, a physician's knowledge of medicine is not required in order to' choose rationally.4 What is primarily needed is knowledge of the alternative courses of treatment and those risks and side-effects which have a bearing on the patient's life plans and values. Risks which are remote and which would have no significant impact on a patient's values do not need to be considered in order to choose in a rational manner. Fourthly, the foregoing remarks should not be taken to imply that the patient cannot waive his right to information by requesting of his physician that information be withheld. Finally, this view is compatible with a recognition that there may be situations in which the patient's right to information is overridden by competing moral considerations. I would not even wish to rule out the possibility that a paternalistic justification for overriding it may exist in some cases.
Choosing rationally The view of the right to self-determination which underlies these comments is that it actually consists in two rights: the right to choose one's life plans autonomously and the right to choose one's life plans rationally. The informational component of the right to informed consent derives from the requirement of non-interference with a person's choosing rationally. The principal way in which one can interfere with a person choosing his plans rationally is to withhold from him information which is needed in order to choose in a rational manner. The physician is often found to be in a position with respect to the patient which would allow him to do this, and to do so when the medical procedure in question has a significant chance of interfering with the patient's life plans would be to interfere with the patient's exercise of his capacity to choose his plans in a rational manner, provided of course the patient has not waived his right to information. Another objection is that the requirement of non-interference with autonomy entails the requirement of giving the patient whatever information he wants. The basis of this objection seems to be the premise that failure to receive wanted information constitutes an obstacle to the patient's decisionmaking and is therefore an interference with his freedom. One approach to rebutting the objection would be to take issue with that premise; however, I find the premise itself to be quite plausible. The difficulty with this objection seems rather to lie with the presupposition that freedom and autonomy are equivalent. Delivering the standard information is a good way to begin the process of adequately informing the patient. Going beyond this, I would encourage a recognition of the limit of the right to information, the answering of those questions which do not obviously go beyond that limit, and an active involvement by physicians in determining what special information a patient needs.
Choosing autonomously

